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Abstract. We study simultaneous price drops of real stocks and show that for high drop thresholds they fol-
low a power-law distribution. To reproduce these collective downturns, we propose a minimal self-organized
model of cascade spreading based on a probabilistic response of the system elements to stress conditions.
This model is solvable using the theory of branching processes and the mean-field approximation. For a
wide range of parameters, the system is in a critical state and displays a power-law cascade-size distribution
similar to the empirically observed one. We further generalize the model to reproduce volatility clustering
and other observed properties of real stocks.
PACS. XX.XX.XX No PACS code given
1 Introduction
Cascade spreading is an important emergent property of
various complex systems. Real life examples of cascades
are numerous and range from infrastructure failures and
epidemics to traffic jams and cultural fads [1,2]. Theoret-
ical models of cascades usually assume that agents can
be in one of two states (healthy or failed) and an agent’s
failure puts some stress on its neighbors which may con-
sequently fail too. See [3] for a recent survey of this field
offering a novel unifying view.
In this paper we focus on cascades in economic sys-
tems which can be identified with stock prices suddenly
dropping in a major market crash [4] or with companies
going bankrupt simultaneously and leading to global re-
cession [5]. Theoretical models of such cascades are based
on shortage and bankruptcy propagation in production
networks [6], default propagation in credit networks [7,8],
interaction of firms through one monopolistic bank [9] or
in a complex credit network economy [10], and herding
behavior of traders [11,12]. While these models help us to
understand cascade processes in economic systems, they
are mostly too involved to allow for analytical solutions—
their study hence relies on numeric simulations and agent-
based modeling [13].
A simpler point of view on cascade phenomena is of-
fered by the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC)
which has had a deep impact on the science of complex-
ity. First introduced more than twenty years ago to ex-
plain the ubiquitous 1/f noise [14], it caused a blossoming
of toy models, computer simulations, and real life exper-
iments [15]. The analytical techniques employed include
scaling arguments [16], mean-field theories [17], branch-
ing processes [18], renormalization methods [19,20], and
rigorous algebraical techniques [21].
SOC is a mechanism which explains the emergence of
complex behavior in many diverse real world systems [22,
23]. The generic behavior of SOCmodels is: (a) they evolve
so that they always stay close to the critical point, (b)
long periods of robustness and moderate activity are inter-
rupted by sudden breakdowns. This qualitatively resem-
bles “stock markets which expand and grow on relatively
long time scales but contract in stock-market crashes on
relatively short time scales” [15] and “stock crashes caused
by the slow buildup of long-range correlation leading to a
global cooperative behavior of the market eventually end-
ing into a collapse in a short time interval” [4]. This simi-
larity provides the main motivation for the present study.
We begin our work with an empirical investigation
of simultaneous price drops of real stocks and show that
the size distribution of observed events is broad (for high
drop thresholds it follows a power-law distribution). This
observation suggests that simultaneous stock downturns
are a collective phenomenon. We propose a simple dy-
namical model which for a wide range of parameters self-
organizes into a critical state. Unlike most SOC models,
our model assumes a probabilistic response mechanism
where a node has only a certain probability of reacting to
the current stress conditions. The basic idea behind mod-
eling simultaneous stock downturns with cascades is that
decline of a single stock may provoke investors’ reactions
which consequently may cause other stocks to decline and
a “cascade” to spread. The key premise is that while failed
nodes become significantly more resistant in the next time
step, healthy nodes become slightly less resistant. This
close parallel with the slow growth/fast decay picture de-
scribed above is further supported by our analysis of em-
pirical data which shows that majority of stocks behave
in this way. While there are certainly many other effects
contributing to the dynamics of market crashes (external
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shocks, for example), we show that failure propagation
alone can reproduce some of the observed patterns.
The minimal model proposed here has the advantage
of being simple, not relying on fine-tuning of parameters,
analytically solvable in some cases, and easily generaliz-
able to more complicated settings. We analyze it using the
formalism of branching processes, the mean-field approxi-
mation and, for complex topologies of nodes’ interactions,
using numerical simulations. Obtained cascade-size distri-
butions exhibit a close similarity to our empirical obser-
vations. Introduction of memory within the model allows
us to reproduce other empirically observed features, such
as volatility clustering, though at the cost of analytical
tractability. We conclude our study with a discussion of
further model’s generalizations and possible areas of ap-
plication.
2 Empirical data
Here we investigate co-occurring price movements of real
stocks. Adopting the vocabulary of cascade models, we say
that a stock fails when the relative loss of its price over
a given time interval ∆t exceeds a certain threshold H .
Denoting the price of stock i at time t as pi(t), its failure
occurs when [pi(t) − pi(t + ∆t)]/pi(t) > H . The number
of stocks failing at time t, nF (t), is a direct analog of the
cascade size in a model of cascade spreading. As the input
data we use daily closing prices (hence ∆t = 1day) of 500
stocks from the standard U.S. index S&P 500 (this data
is freely available at, for example, finance.yahoo.com).
To achieve a fixed system size, we consider only those
332 companies which are in the stock market since the
beginning of 1992 and use their prices during the 18-years
long period ending in May 2010 for our analysis.
The empirical distribution of failure sizes is shown in
Fig. 1 for H = 0% and H = 10%. We see that for the
large value of H (which is in line with the notion of stock
failures), the observed size distribution has a power-law
shape. Using the methodology described in [24], we ob-
tained the power-law exponent 2.19± 0.05 with the lower
bound for the power-law behavior nmin = 3. The corre-
sponding p-value (obtained using the standard Kolmogo-
rov-Smirnov statistic) is 0.92 which confirms that the data
is consistent with the hypothesis of a power-law distribu-
tion. Similar results are obtained also for other threshold
values so long as H & 8%. When H . 8%, the resulting
size distributions are broad but probably not power-law.
Finally, when H = 0% (i.e., any price drop is interpreted
as a failure), the size distribution is roughly symmetric
around the value corresponding to one half of the system
size (see Fig. 1). In the following analysis of empirical data
we use the threshold H = 10%.
The power-law shape itself suggests that the observed
simultaneous stock downturns are rather a collective phe-
nomenon than independent events. This hypothesis is fur-
ther supported by the average correlation of simultane-
ously failing stocks, 0.35 (again including only events with
at least three simultaneously failing stocks), which is sig-
nificantly higher than the overall average stock correla-
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Fig. 1. The empirical failure size distribution observed with
real stock prices (daily closing prices of 332 companies from
January 1992 until May 2010) for threshold relative drops
H = 0% and H = 10%. The straight line corresponds to the
exponent 2.19 obtained by statistical analysis of the data.
tion, 0.25. Another sign of a strong connection among si-
multaneously failing stocks comes from their division to
ten different industrial sectors according to the GICS clas-
sification. The effective number of sectors participating in
a cascade is defined as
e :=
( 10∑
i=1
r2i
)−1
(1)
where ri is the relative share of sector i in the cascade and∑10
i=1 ri = 1. By averaging this quantity over all cascades
of a given size S, we obtain e(S). This number can be com-
pared with the effective number of sectors corresponding
to selecting failed stocks at random, e′(S). The analysis of
stock prices shows that for any S > 3, e(S) is significantly
smaller than e′(S) which implies that simultaneous stock
failures preferentially affect strongly connected stocks in
one sector or in a small number of sectors.
Now we turn our attention to time correlations of fail-
ures. The autocorrelation of the number of failing stocks
with the time lag one day, C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ 0.15, is
comparable with the autocorrelation of absolute returns,
C(|r(t)|, |r(t + 1)|) ≈ 0.25 (the latter result agrees with
previous studies [25,26]). The positive autocorrelation val-
ues are signs of volatility clustering which is commonly ob-
served in financial data [27]. (Loosely speaking, volatility
clustering means that large changes tend to be followed
by large changes and small changes tend to be followed by
small changes, as first noted by Mandelbrot [28].)
We further estimate conditional failure probabilities
for individual stocks. For example, P (F |N) denotes fail-
ure probability of a stock given that this stock didn’t fail
in the previous time step (other three quantities, P (N |F ),
P (F |F ), and P (N |N), follow the same logic). When the
results are averaged over all stocks, we obtain P (F |F ) =
0.039 which is much higher than the overall failure proba-
bility P (F ) = 0.003—this is another sign of volatility clus-
tering in our data. On the level of individual stocks, how-
ever, 62% of all stocks with at least three failures strongly
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satisfy the inequality P (N |F ) > P (N) which is equiva-
lent to P (F |F ) < P (F ) (because P (F |F )+P (N |F ) = 1).
(By strong satisfying we mean that the difference of the
two probabilities is greater than the sum of their uncer-
tainties.) We see that despite volatility clustering in the
data, most stocks are more “resistant” to failures after
they have just undergone one. For the remaining stocks,
probabilities P (N |F ) and P (N) either differ less than the
sum of values’ uncertainties (for 14% of stocks) or even
strongly satisfy the opposite inequality P (N |F ) < P (N),
with corresponding values of P (F |F ) often as high as 0.30
(24% of stocks).
To summarize, after a failure (a major price drop),
most stocks become more resistant to another failure—
this observation will serve as a basis for the mathemati-
cal model presented in the following section. At the same
time, there is a fraction of stocks which are prone to con-
secutive failures—this particular feature will be discussed
in detail in Section 4.
3 Basic model and its mean-field solution
In this section we present a basic model which is amenable
to analytical treatment and qualitatively reproduces some
of the features observed in empirical data. In its original
formulation, this model is particularly suitable for stocks
that, as discussed in the previous section, after a failure
become more robust. A generalization of the model aiming
at reproducing other observed features (volatility cluster-
ing, for example) is presented in Section 4.
Consider a system of N nodes where node i (i =
1, . . . , N) has only two possible states: failed (i ∈ F) and
healthy (i 6∈ F). With each node i we further associate
fragility fi ∈ [0, 1] which measures how this node reacts
to failures of its neighbors (the higher the fragility, the
more likely is the node to follow a neighbor’s failure). The
dynamics of the model is governed by the following sim-
ple rules. (i) In each time step, the first failed node (“trig-
ger”) is chosen at random and may induce failures of other
nodes. (ii) If a neighbor of node i fails, node i follows it
with probability fi and resists with probability 1− fi. (If
several neighbors of node i fail simultaneously, in order
to stay healthy, node i has to resist each individual fail-
ure.) The cascade of failures propagates until all remaining
nodes resist the damage. (iii) At the end of the time step,
fragilities of all nodes are updated according to
fi(t+ 1) =
{ λfi(t) i ∈ F
(1 + β)fi(t) i 6∈ F (2)
where 0 < β ≪ 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters of
the model (in effect, failed nodes become less fragile and
healthy nodes become slightly more fragile in the next
time step). All values fi(t + 1) > 1 are truncated to 1
(this may occur when β is large). After this update is
finished, all nodes are again marked as healthy, the cur-
rent time step ends and a new one begins with point (i).
Note that unlike some other models of cascade spread-
ing, failed nodes are not removed from the system in our
case. If a long enough equilibration period is applied be-
fore measuring the system behavior, the initial fragility
values fi(0) are of little importance (see Section 3.5 for a
detailed discussion). Unless stated otherwise, we set them
randomly in the range (0, 1) in our simulations.
According to the rules above, when n neighbors of node
i fail, node i resists with the probability (1−fi)n and fails
with the complementary probability
PF (fi, n) = 1− (1 − fi)n. (3)
This response to failures is “path-independent” in some
sense: the probability that a node resists n failures of its
neighbors, (1 − fi)n, is the same as the probability of re-
sisting two consequent waves of failures of x and n − x
neighboring nodes, (1− fi)x(1− fi)n−x.
We simplify the system by assuming that interactions
of all nodes are equally strong (the general case will be
studied in Section 3.4). This renders the notion of “node’s
neighbors” superfluous because every failure affects all re-
maining healthy nodes in the system. Now assume that
after the initial failed node is chosen, n1 nodes respond to
this failure and fail too. Each of the remaining N−n0−n1
nodes (here n0 = 1 is the initial number of failed nodes)
then has some n1-dependent failure probability which re-
sults in n2 new failures, and so on, until in iteration m,
nm = 0 is achieved. The cascade size is then defined as
the total number of failures, S = n0 + · · ·+ nm, and node
fragilities are consequently updated according to Eq. (2).
Since in one turn nodes can only fail once, cascade sizes
are limited by the system size and S ≤ N .
The dynamics of the system, based on failure propaga-
tion and fragility updating, is fully contained in the three
above-described rules. In the following paragraphs we shall
study when these rules drive the system to a critical state
and what is the distribution of cascade sizes P (S).
3.1 Failure probability
Let PF be the average failure probability of a given node
in one time step (or, equivalently, the average fraction
of failed nodes in one time step). Assuming that teq is
some sufficiently long equilibration time (we use teq =
104 for all our simulations), later fragility values averaged
over realizations, 〈fi〉, do not evolve anymore. All nodes
interact equally strongly, hence 〈fi〉 is independent of i
and it can be replaced with 〈f〉. Since in a large number
of time steps T each node undergoes PFT failures and
(1− PF )T non-failures, Eq. (2) implies
〈f(teq + T )〉 = 〈f(teq)〉λPF T (1 + β)(1−PF )T . (4)
Using the equilibrium condition 〈f(teq + T )〉 = 〈f(teq)〉,
we can solve this equation with respect to PF to get
PF (β, λ) = − ln(1 + β)
ln λ1+β
. (5)
When β ≪ 1, this can be approximated with PF (β, λ) ≈
−β/ lnλ (Fig. 2 compares these results with numerical
simulations).
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Fig. 2. Average failure probability: PF given by Eq. (5) (solid
black line), PF ≈ −β/ lnλ (dashed blue line) and numerical
results (symbols, averaged over 106 time steps) for N = 103,
λ = 0.1. The vertical dotted line indicates β0 given by Eq. (6).
A node may fail because it is selected as the first failed
node (with probability 1/N) or due to failure propagation
(with probability PP ); PF thus can be written as PF =
1/N+PP . Since the value of PF depends solely on β and λ,
PP = PF −1/N may be negative for a small system which
is, of course, impossible in practice. This situation occurs
when for given λ,N , the value of β is smaller than a certain
threshold β0 and hence it does not suffice to compensate
for the fragility decay due to λ. Eq. (4) then has only
the trivial solution 〈f〉 = 0 and hence PF (β, λ) = 1/N
(failures do not spread). When β is small, the approximate
form of PF can be used to solve this equation with respect
to β and we get
β0 ≈ − lnλ
N
(6)
which agrees with numerical simulations (see the vertical
line in Fig. 2). Note that if the number of initial failed
nodes is assumed to grow with the system size as wN
(w ≪ 1), we get β0 ≈ −w lnλ which is independent of N .
When model parameters are set to extreme values (for
example, N = 103, β = 103, λ = 10−3), the system ex-
hibits unusual modes of behavior where active turns (with
nearly all nodes failed) alternate with calm turns (with
nearly all nodes healthy). While Eq. (5) holds also in such
conditions, our further analysis focuses on β ≪ 1 which
renders more realistic behavior.
3.2 Average fragility
When nfi ≪ 1, PF given by Eq. (3) can be approximated
as PF (fi, n) ≈ nfi which can be interpreted as indepen-
dence of stress inflicted by n individual failed nodes. This
further means that each failed node has its failing descen-
dants independently of other failed nodes and hence one
can use the theory of branching processes [29] to describe
the cascade spreading. Note that by use of this theory we
implicitly assume that the system size is infinite. For a dis-
cussion of the finite-size effects on the size of an epidemic
outbreak see [30].
As already mentioned, when interactions of all nodes
are equal, 〈fi〉 is independent of i. If we further neglect
fluctuations of fi, then all nodes have identical fragility
〈f〉. This is a mean-field-like approximation which replaces
the exact cascade spreading with cascade spreading in a
homogeneous averaged medium. Since the number of di-
rect descendants now follows a simple binomial distribu-
tion with mean N〈f〉, we can use elementary results of
branching process theory to express the average cascade
size (the total progeny) as 〈S〉 = 1/(1 − N〈f〉). Further,
using 〈S〉 = NPF (β, λ) we obtain the average fragility
〈f〉 = 1
N
(
1− ln
[
(1 + β)/λ
]
N ln(1 + β)
)
. (7)
Since β > 0 and λ < 1, 〈f〉 is always less than 1/N . Com-
parison with numerical simulations (not shown) confirms
that Eq. (7) is valid only for β ≪ 1.
3.3 Cascade size distribution
The theory of branching processes is well studied [31] and
can be easily applied to our model. According to a theo-
rem from [32], if the generating function for the number
of direct descendants d is pi(x), the total progeny of the
resulting branching process Y has the distribution
P (Y |n0) = n0
Y
p
(Y )
Y−n0
(8)
where p
(b)
a is defined using
[pi(x)]b = p
(b)
0 + p
(b)
1 x+ . . . (9)
and n0 is the number of ancestors (in our case, the number
of initial failed nodes). Since d obeys a binomial distribu-
tion, its generating function is pi(x) = (1 − 〈f〉 + 〈f〉x)N
and we get
P (S|β, λ) = 1
S
(
NS
S − 1
)
〈f〉S−1(1− 〈f〉)NS−S+1 (10)
where we used n0 = 1 and 〈f〉 is given by Eq. (7). Note
that the resulting probability is positive for S > N which
contradicts the model assumptions (each node fails at
most once in a given turn). This is a direct consequence
of using the theory of branching processes which assumes
that the system size is infinite. This problem is of little im-
portance for small values of β when the obtained values
of P (S) are negligible for S > N .
When 1≪ S ≪ N , Eq. (10) can be approximated with
P (S|β, λ) = (N〈f〉)
S−1eS(1−N〈f〉)√
2piS3/2
. (11)
According to Eq. (7), limN→∞N〈f〉 = 1 for any given β, λ
and hence in the limit of large system size is P (S|β, λ) ∼
S−3/2 which corresponds to the classical critical branching
process. For a finite system, the smaller the value of β, the
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larger the value of 1−N〈f〉. Consequently, the power-law
scaling holds only for S ≪ βN (this agrees with Fig. 3
where for β = 10−3, the power-law behavior disappears
at S ≈ 10). On the other hand, the range of β and λ for
which the system self-organizes to a critical state is wide
and we can say that this is an SOC system.
A comparison of the obtained analytical results with
numerical simulations is shown in Fig. 3. The agreement
is good for small values of β (β . 0.01) and the initial
slope of the distributions (before the finite-size effects be-
come apparent) is close to −3/2. Results obtained with
β = 0.001 confirm that when β is small enough, P (S)
decays faster than as a power law. When β is large, true
P (S) deviates from the analytical prediction and exhibits
a secondary maximum at a large size value—this effect is
well visible in Fig. 3 for β = 0.1. This maximum, formally
simply a super-critical phase of the model, resembles so-
called meaningful outliers discussed in [33]. To estimate
the value of β at which the secondary maximum appears
and Eq. (10) ceases to hold, we take the average number
of failures computed both from Eq. (10) and from Eq. (5).
By comparing the two results we obtain
NPF (β, λ) =
N∑
S=1
SP (S|β, λ). (12)
When β is small, both sides of this equation depend on
β and the equality can hold. However, Eq. (11) shows
that when β is sufficiently large, the size distribution is
approximately power-law and it is independent of β. As
we increase β further, the power-law distribution does not
suffice to provide enough failures and for Eq. (12) to hold,
an additional contribution must appear on the rights side.
The value β1 when this happens can be found by substi-
tuting P (S) ∼ S−3/2 on the right side and approximating
the summation with integration. When N is large, we ob-
tain
β1 ≈ −
(
2
piN
)1/2
lnλ (13)
which complements the previously found threshold β0. For
N = 104 and λ = 0.1, we obtain β1 ≈ 0.02 which agrees
with our empirical observation (β . 0.01 for Eq. (10) to
hold) above.
Finally, by comparing the empirical observations pre-
sented in Fig. 1 with the obtained analytical results, we
can conclude that the presented model exhibits qualitative
agreement with the studied real system.
3.4 Generalizations
To test how robust are the obtained results, we consider
simple generalizations of the proposed model. First of all,
when the multiplicative fragility update rule Eq. (2) is
replaced by an additive one, the behavior of the system
does not change considerably. The second generalization
relates to the assumed even influence of a node’s failure on
all the remaining nodes. Denoting the strength of failure
propagation from node i to node j as Ci,j , the probability
100 101 102 103 104
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Fig. 3. The cascade size distribution: numerical results (color
lines), analytical results according to Eq. (10) (dashed lines)
and the power-law decay with exponent −3/2 (thick solid line)
for N = 104, λ = 0.1, 107 time steps, and β = 0.001 (red line,
fastest decay), β = 0.01 (green line, medium decay), β = 0.1
(blue line, slowest decay). The analytical solution is not plotted
for β = 0.1 because it is very similar to that for β = 0.01.
that node j fails as a result of i’s failure can be generalized
to Ci,jfj. The probability that node j fails as a result
of a group F of failed nodes (given by Eq. (3) before)
generalizes to the form
PF (fj ,F) = 1−
∏
i∈F
(1− Ci,jfj). (14)
Matrix C encodes the structure of the network of node
interactions.
When the elements Ci,j are drawn independently from
a given distribution and the system size is large, the mean-
field approximation is again appropriate to describe the
system behavior and the power-law size distribution with
exponent 3/2 results. Similarly when C contains a block
structure with inter-block elements drawn from a differ-
ent distribution than intra-block elements (this mimics the
sector structure of the stock correlation matrix [26,34]),
the original power-law size distribution remains largely
unchanged (unless either the block division of C or one of
the two probabilistic distributions are such that they do
not allow to use the mean-field approximation). Analogous
behavior results from the “random neighbor approxima-
tion” in which node’s neighbors are chosen anew repeat-
edly (see [35] for this kind of analysis of a different model).
When all elements Ci,j are either zero or one, matrix C
can be represented by a network and a complex topology
of node interactions can be introduced by network mod-
els [36]. We studied two different types of networks: the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network where Ci,j = 1 with probability p
and Ci,j = 0 otherwise and the growing Baraba´si-Albert
network where each new node is attached to I old nodes.
(These two kinds of networks are structurally very distinct
as the former consists of nodes of approximately identical
degree and the latter exhibits a power-law degree distribu-
tion.) Numerical results for both cases are shown in Fig. 4.
As expected, for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with p > 1/N ,
6 Stanislao Gualdi, Matu´sˇ Medo, Yi-Cheng Zhang: Self-organized model of cascade spreading
100 101 102 103 104
S
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P (S )
(a)
p = 5 · 10-5
p = 10-4
p = 10-3
100 101 102 103 104
S
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P (S )
(b)
I = 1
I = 10
Fig. 4. The cascade size distribution on complex networks:
(a) sparse Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with p = 5 · 10−5, 10−4, 10−3;
the indicative thick line has slope 1.5, (b) Baraba´si-Albert net-
works with I = 1 and I = 10; the indicative thick line has slope
1.65). Parameters of the system: N = 104, β = 0.005, λ = 0.1,
107 time steps.
the size distribution exponent remains unchanged. When
p < 1/N , the network consists of small isolated compo-
nents and hence big cascades cannot occur. The irregular
size distribution P (S) observed for β = 5 · 10−5 is due to
topological properties of the particular network realization
where the model was simulated (i.e., positions of respec-
tive ups and downs of the size distribution depend on the
network realization). These results agree with a previous
study of the sandpile dynamics [37] (see [38] for an exten-
sive recent review of critical phenomena in complex net-
works). By contrast, Baraba´si-Albert networks yield cas-
cade size distributions with significantly higher exponents
(approximately 1.65) which is probably due to strong in-
homogeneity of the network. When I = 1, P (S) deviates
from a power law, probably as a consequence of the scale-
free network topology (the same shape of the distribution
is observed for different realizations of the network).
3.5 Role of the initial fragility values
While it sounds plausible that due to model’s stochastic-
ity, the initial fragility values have no influence on the
0
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Fig. 5. Fragility distributions at different time steps (the initial
fragility values are set to 1/N , N = 104, β = 0.001, λ = 0.1).
equilibrium fragility distribution, the situation is in fact
more complicated. For example, a simple numerical sim-
ulation with fi(0) = 1/N for all i shows a case where:
(i) no stationary fragility distribution arises, (ii) at any
time step, only a small number of distinct fragility val-
ues is observed (see Fig. 5). What causes the discreteness
of fragility values? Denoting the number of failing and
healthy time steps of node i as Fi and Hi, respectively, it
must hold that Fi + Hi = t where t is the current time
step. This node’s fragility now can be written as
fi(t) = fi(0)(1 + β)
t
[
λ/(1 + β)
]Fi
. (15)
When all fi(0) are identical, the possible values of fi(t)
are discrete at any time step t and the ratio of neighbor-
ing possible values is (1 + β)/λ. If λ is small (as it is in
our simulations), this ratio is large and hence the number
of actually observed fragility values is small (because val-
ues much smaller or greater than the average fragility are
unlikely). Eq. (15) implies that possible fragility values de-
pend on t and hence there can be no stationary fragility
distribution—this is confirmed by Fig. 5 where fragility
peaks constantly shift to higher values and change their
relative heights. Interestingly, even this peculiar setting of
fi(0) does not alter the long-term model’s behavior sub-
stantially and the aggregate quantities (such as the av-
erage failure probability or the cascade size distribution)
are similar to those found for randomized initial fragility
values before.
Differences between neighboring peaks are λ/(1 + β),
hence the time after which the fragility distribution pat-
tern repeats can be estimated as ln
[
λ/(1+β)
]
/ ln(1+β).
Since this is a typical time of fragility evolution, one can
use it also as an estimate of the initial equilibration time
Teq. For the smallest value of β in our simulations (β =
0.005) we obtain Teq ≈ 4 600 which ex post confirms
our setting of the equilibration time to 104. Finally, note
that while the random setting of fi(0) prevents discrete
fragility values from appearing, some remnants of the ini-
tial fragility values can be preserved by Eq. (15). To ob-
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tain a fragility distribution truly independent of the initial
values, one has to assume annealed dynamics, i.e. fragility
updating by randomized values of β and λ.
4 Generalized model with partial memory
Fragility updating rules defined by Eq. (2) imply that
nodes become more robust after a failure and hence au-
tocorrelation of their failures as well as autocorrelation of
the total number of failures are negative (their magnitudes
depend on β and λ). As discussed in Section 2, this is true
for majority of stocks but certainly not for all of them.
To allow for repeatedly failing stocks, we introduce the
probability α with which a failed node stays failed also in
the next time step (and consequently acts as an additional
initial failed node). This probability has the role of par-
tial memory in the system and, as we shall see, gives rise
to volatility clustering and other effects observed in real
financial data. Note that memory or delayed stress propa-
gation are quite often part of cascade spreading models as
in, for example, [39]. We assume that fragilities of nodes
which stay failed due to α are not updated in the given
time step (when α is small, this assumption has little in-
fluence on the results).
Since P (F ) ≪ 1, the probability of a node’s repeated
failure is now P (F |F ) ≈ α which, in combination with
the empirical results presented in Section 2, motivates
us to set α = 0.04. We further choose β = 0.01 and
λ = 0.1 which best correspond to the critical regime in
Fig. 3. Using this setting we numerically obtain condi-
tional probabilities consistent with those observed in the
empirical data: P (F |F ) = 0.041 (empirical value is 0.039),
P (F ) = 0.004 (empirical value is 0.003) and P (F |N) =
0.004 (empirical value is 0.003). As long as we stay in the
critical regime, these values depend on β and λ weakly.
Presence of volatility clustering is confirmed by signifi-
cantly positive autocorrelation of the number of failures
C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ 0.3 (empirical value is 0.15). The
precise value depends on α and λ (and much less on β)
but positive autocorrelation naturally arises for α which is
large enough. By contrast, α = 0 yields P (F |F ) ≈ P (F )
and C(nF (t), nF (t + 1)) ≈ −0.04. Finally, Fig. 6 shows
P (S) for different values of α. We see that for small values
of α, the size distribution remains power-law with expo-
nent gradually decreasing as α grows. Due to the addi-
tional complexity introduced by partial memory, an ana-
lytical cascade size distribution for this generalized model
has not been obtained yet.
5 Discussion
We studied empirical stock prices and found that large
simultaneous downturns follow a broad distribution con-
sistent with a power law with exponent 2.19 ± 0.05. To
reproduce this behavior, we proposed a minimal stochas-
tic model of failure propagation. Using a mean field ap-
proximation and branching process theory we derived the
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Fig. 6. Cascade size distribution for the modified model: nu-
merical results for β = 0.01, λ = 0.1, N = 104, 107 time steps,
and various values of α.
general cascade size distribution and determined the range
of parameters which give rises to the critical regime. To
reproduce other features observed in financial data, such
as volatility clustering, partial memory was introduced
within the basic model.
While our model implicitly assumes arrival of news to
the market (they cause the initial nodes to fail and allow
cascades to be created), we minimize the influence of news
on the system’s behavior by assuming their equal impact
(in each time step, exactly one initial node is chosen to
fail). This approach is motivated by the extensive study
of excess volatility which shows that it is difficult to link
the observed trading volumes and volatility to the arriving
information [40] and even the large crash of 1987 does not
seem to be triggered by particular news [41]. In reality,
of course, the impact of news on the market differs from
one day to another. It could be therefore interesting to
test how different ways of choosing the initial failed nodes
influence the model’s behavior (for example, the number
of the initial nodes can be random or network hubs may
be preferentially chosen to trigger a cascade).
There is a number of other challenging questions which
deserve further investigation. Firstly, since the cascade
sizes corresponding to the secondary maximum in Fig. 3
are comparable with system size, this behavior cannot
be described within the formalism of branching processes
where an infinite system size is assumed. While we found
an approximate condition for the appearance of the sec-
ondary maximum, how to proceed further towards an ex-
haustive description of the resulting size distribution is
still an open question. Secondly, it would be interesting to
find an analytical expression for the size distribution expo-
nent in scale-free networks where it appears to differ from
the mean-field value 3/2. Thirdly, generalized model with
“partial memory”, studied only numerically here, calls for
analytical approaches. Fourthly, it would be interesting
to know whether the model can be modified to produce
power-law size distributions with exponents considerably
higher than those reported here. One opportunity for such
a generalization is to assume a dynamic network structure
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whose evolution depends on nodes’ failures, similarly to
the approach used in [42,43] for different models. Alter-
natively, as a generalization of the current binary model
where nodes are either healthy or failed, one could define
a multi or continuous-state model in which the probability
of following a neighbor’s failure depends on the failure’s
magnitude.
We stress that the probabilistic spreading mechanism
proposed here is a general one and its use is not limited to
market crashes or firm bankruptcies. For example, eco-
nomic exchanges between countries are so intense that
decline in one country may propagate to a neighboring
one (take, for example, how growth in many European
countries depends on spending of German consumers). On
a two or three dimensional lattice, a similar mechanism
might be employed to model earthquakes because, simi-
larly to the proposed model, a failure at one place of the
Earth’s crust exerts some stress on its neighborhood (the
number of failed nodes would then represent the earth-
quake size). In summary, the proposed model, together
with its generalizations, has proven to be simple yet rich
in behavior. It poses a variety of new research questions
and we are looking forward to its future development and
applications.
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